jurisdictional and standing challenges that bankruptcies can pose, 5 and offer claimants the opportunity to be heard and determine their own resolution of claims. 6 At this point, though, relatively few judicial opinions discuss bankruptcy mediation or its impact. Not surprisingly, the few cases available demonstrate that bankruptcy courts generally favor the use of mediation to resolve claims and help with reorganizations. 7 What is surprising, however, are the cases in which parties have attempted to use mediation to achieve unexpected and inappropriate results 8 and those in which bankruptcy judges, parties and/or their lawyers apparently expect mediators to do much more than facilitate the parties' communication, negotiation and resolution. 9 Sometimes, for example, judicial opinions reveal an assumption that mediators will make both procedural and substantive decisions, and that in reviewing these decisions, judges should grant substantial deference to the mediators.' l Cases such as these may suggest that the repeat players within bankruptcy-judges, lawyers, accountants, and creditorsll'-do not necessarily understand how the role of the mediator is supposed to diverge in significant ways from the "traditional neutral" roles of trustee, special master, magistrate, arbitrator, examiner or judge. An appropriate response would appear to be education of the repeat players involved in bankruptcies.
On the other hand, these few cases also may signal that mediation will not always be the most appropriate vehicle for resolving issues within, or related to, bankruptcy. Instead, it may be that bankruptcy courts should both incorporate mediation in appropriate cases and consider expanding the availability or functions of "traditional neutrals." In the bankruptcy context, that might mean experimenting with the use of trustees and examiners in innovative procedures that include, as one part of the procedures, facilitation of dialogue and consensual resolution.1 2 Importantly, bankruptcy courts would need to ensure that both trustees and examiners receive training in facilitation skills and procedures that will help them manage this new function appropriately and achieve both procedural and substantive justice.
Though divorce and child custody matters may seem far-removed from bankruptcy proceedings, liquidations and reorganizations bear some intriguing superficial similarities to divorces and ongoing custody and support arrangements (perhaps better termed "familial reorganizations" for purposes of this Article). In addition, an examination of the use, abuse and evolution of mediation in this area of practice may prove useful for those who are now introducing mediation into bankruptcy. The story of divorce and child custody mediation, like most growingup stories, follows a trajectory of rejection of the status quo, successful experimentation with alternatives, enthusiastic over-promising, overuse and consequent struggles or breakdown, disappointment, reluctant recognition of limits, and finally acceptance of the need for realistic retrenchment and more restrained growth. As in the bankruptcy context, the use of certain "traditional neutrals"-e.g., custody investigators, referees, conciliators-has been curtailed in many jurisdictions as the judiciary developed a preference for the consensual and flexible process of mediation. 3 Recently, however, some commentators have begun to urge a closer look at the reality of today's court-connected divorce and child custody mediation programs.1 4 These commentators have begun advocating for a more limited use of mediation, in part due to the emergence of new, hybrid dispute resolution models that confound any bright line distinction between consensual and adjudicative approaches. 15 Is it possible that bankruptcy courts, repeat players within the system and their clients could skip a couple of the stages that were involved in the evolution of divorce and child custody mediation? Only if there is 
"There is no question that many judges perceive mediation as a dispute resolution process in which clients are given the opportunity to be active participants in negotiated solutions, and that these solutions may be better and more durable than those reached in the litigation process without mediation.").
14 See Janet A. [Vol. 17: 427
willingness to consider the lessons of others' history (or as this Article's title suggests, "her/history"). In this Article, I will articulate my understanding of the unfolding stories 16 of mediation in various parts of the civil litigation system and suggest what these stories may teach.
I. THE INTRODUCTION OF MEDIATION INTO THE COURTS
In recent years, many have written their own narratives of the story of mediation in the United States. 17 For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to begin by noting that mediation-a process in which a third party called a 'mediator' assists disputing parties to reach their own, consensual resolution of their dispute-has existed in the United States for a very long time. Colonists 18 and Quakers 9 used a mediation process to resolve disputes. Following a period of tremendous social unrest in the late 1800s and early 1900s-as the U.S. reconceived itself after the Civil War, morphed from a pastoral to an industrial power, and experienced disruptive and sometimes-violent labor disputes as displaced citizens and waves of immigrants dealt with major economic change and deep cultural, class and wage was rejected in some areas, 21 the U.S. Congress ultimately chose to make mediation and arbitration central to the resolution of labor disputes. 22 Then, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, during another period of social transformation 23 and heightened distrust of authority, 2 4 advocates began calling for the use of mediation to resolve community and family disputes. In 1976, judges, lawyers, and others gathered for the Pound Conference 25 where Harvard Professor Frank Sander delivered a speech that is now remembered primarily for its advocacy of a "multi-door courthouse, 26 that would include mediation. By the late 1980s, largely in response to crushing dockets, courts were beginning to adopt mediation to resolve small claims, family, and non-family civil cases. 27 Today, less than twenty years later, mediation is an integral part of the civil litigation process in the United States. 28 State, federal, and administrative courts in the 1920s that there were better ways to make use of conflict -to embrace it and to use it for more creative and innovative solutions .... "). To prepare for the challenges of the 21st century, the judges, lawyers and academics assembled in St. Paul offered bold ideas for change to address the problems of justice being faced by the courts.). 26 Id. at 402 (Professor Sander used the term "multi-door courthouse" to suggest a variety of dispute resolution techniques that could be fit to the needs of the dispute.); Moffitt, supra note 5 (The phrase first "appeared as a companion to a graphic on the cover of a magazine reporting on the Pound Conference.") ( On the other hand, this process called 'mediation' can also be implemented in a manner that is evaluative, 43 directive, 44 and focused on bargaining. 45 These models present a rather different picture, in which the mediator plays the central role, hopefully beginning by listening to the disputing parties but quickly shifting the focus to the provision of advice to the parties and their lawyers, to help them be realistic regarding their options (usually in civil litigation or administrative adjudication) and to guide them toward a resolution consistent with those options. 46 The available research suggests that the most effective mediations (and mediators) are likely to combine elements of all of these models. 47 A wealth of research and theory also affirms the importance of providing a mediation process enable the parties' individual and joint will to emerge" between perceptions of process fairness in negotiation and negotiators' perceptions of fairness of proposed outcomes). In addition to the relationship of the parties to the third-party mediator, the relationship between the parties involved in the mediation and the negotiators themselves is also important. Negotiators' relative status in the group helps to determine the impact of procedural fairness on their attitudes and behaviors. In a negotiation between two individuals that perceive themselves to be of uneven status, the lower status negotiator will likely be more satisfied with the outcome if she perceives she has been treated in a procedurally just manner by the higher status negotiator. On the other hand, the higher status negotiator will perceive the process to be fair only if there is a favorable outcome. Id. at 171; Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 46, at 818 ("Disputants who believe that they have been treated in a procedurally fair manner are more likely to conclude that the resulting outcome is substantively fair."). Researchers have found that procedural justice matters. Disputants' perceptions of the justice provided by a procedure affect their judgments of the distributive justice provided by the outcome, their compliance with that outcome, and their faith in the legitimacy of the institution that offered the procedure. Disputants use the following indicia to assess procedural justice: whether the procedure provided them with the opportunity to tell their stories; whether the third party considered their stories; and whether the third party treated them in an even-handed and dignified manner. So which model of mediation is best? Which model should be institutionalized in the courts, particularly courts with mandatory mediation programs? Battles have been fought over these questions 53 and research has been done, 54 fueled at least in part by the hunger for legitimacy and access to the remunerative 55 business of mediation.
The answers to these questions depend, of course, on the goals of the mediation process. If the aim of mediation is to enhance the parties' ability to communicate and negotiate directly with each other-which may be particularly important when there will be an ongoing relationship 56 and a need to collaborate in the implementation of any agreement-it appears important for the process to foster parties' ability to engage in "mutual consideration. 5 7 In other words, the parties active role by commenting on parties' argument strength and outlining settlement ranges); Welsh, Stepping Back, supra note 47, at 576 (identifying "transformative" interventions as process of "enhancing disputants' communication and mutual understanding to enable the disputants to find their own way to a settlement" through their own empowerment). [Vol. 17: 427 need the opportunity to speak and be heard, but they also need the opportunity to listen to each other, reflect upon what was said and demonstrate that they have listened to each other.
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For a variety of reasons, the achievement of mutual consideration can be a significant challenge. At least some percentage of disputing parties-perhaps those who are less polarized, afraid or stressed; inherently creative; reasonably assertive and confident; able to achieve some distance from their dispute-will be able to engage in the elicitive, facilitative, and transformative process described supra and ultimately craft their own resolution, one that they will implement through good times and bad. 59 The needs of these parties-provided there is also some surplus to divide in their bargaining zone and/or the opportunity for logrolling or the creation of new, integrative options-will be fully met by a mediation in which the mediator limits herself to the use of facilitative, elicitive and perhaps transformative interventions.
Parties who do not quite match this profile may be lucky enough to be assisted by lawyers who possess the creativity, assertiveness, empathy, rationality and detachment that their clients lack. These lawyers also may fully understand, respect and be able to communicate the needs of their clients. 60 Furthermore, these lawyers may possess a full complement of the more traditional abilities of the lawyersufficient substantive knowledge to provide competent representation, along with the ability to analyze, speak and write "like a lawyer."' 61 Parties represented by these lawyers may also find their needs sufficiently met by a facilitative, elicitive and/or transformative model of mediation. 62 But for those parties who cannot achieve a sufficiently-positive problemsolving state---or when their lawyers do not possess the skills and knowledge 58 See id. at 639 (noting positive and negative reactions to real mediation between parents and school officials); see also Shestowsky, supra note 51, at 567 (noting main ADR goal gives individuals selfdetermination over mediation). described supra or do not have an ideal relationship with their clients, or when there is no surplus to divide-the more appropriate mediation process may be one in which the mediator first listens with an open mind and in a manner that conveys respect and then moves toward dignified, participatory education of the parties about their options, advises them about the fairness of these options, and helps them to make an appropriate choice. These procedural characteristics, of course, are consistent with a model of mediation that begins in a facilitative manner then, if necessary, begins to include evaluative or directive elements. I hasten to add, however, that these characteristics are not consistent with coercive or muscle mediation.
Research suggests that institutional and financial pressures have forced courtconnected mediation (and mediators) to become predominantly evaluative, directive-and even coercive. Many have laid the blame for this transformation at lawyers' doors, 6 3 observing that lawyers' participation has made the mediation process more adversarial and single-mindedly focused on the law and legal procedures. There is much to support this assessment. Lawyers tend to select other lawyers as mediators, dominate the discussions in the mediation process, seek case valuation and reality-testing, and focus on brokering a deal. 64 The achievement of mutual understanding between the parties seems to be an issue that some lawyers think about 65 but not many. It is also important to note, however, that this transformation may have something to do with the courts themselves-and particularly with the courts' relative lack of resources and focus on "speedy" and "inexpensive, 67 disposition. Some courts now assume that a mediation will be completed in an hour. Courts have long tracked the rate at which mediation successfully settles cases and have regularly noted mediation's value as a means to reduce the size of the court's docket. 68 None of these preferences or behaviors is inherently evil. Instead, as courts deal constantly with cost-conscious administrators, intrusive legislators, and unhappy citizens who arrive with difficult problems that require timely resolution, courts are acting in a manner consistent with institutional self-preservation. 69 And there is one other factor that must be considered-the parties themselves. Very few people go directly to court after they have been harmed. Most peopleeven allegedly litigious Americans-prefer not to go to court. 7v Plaintiffs must proceed through a multi-stage psychological process-naming, blaming, and claiming 7 '-before they sue defendants. Usually, at least one of the parties involved in this lawsuit has tried to negotiate with the other-and has been unsuccessful. 72 In the United States, research shows that only a small percentage of 66 See Relis, supra note 64, at 463-64 (noting female and/or in-house hospital lawyers were more likely to raise this possibility); Riskin & Welsh, supra note 42, at 869-73 (discussing goal of mediation is to attend to parties' needs but evidence shows this is rarity); Welsh, Looking Down the Road, supra note 65, at 50-51 (hypothesizing about why so many lawyers find it so difficult to deal with emotional issues and how those issues may benefit from acknowledgment in legal practice). Meanwhile, judges referring parties to mediation do seem impressed with this potential benefit of the process. See McAdoo, supra note 13, at 398-99 (stating judicial preference for discussion between parties as result of mediation those who perceive that they have suffered a harm end up bringing a lawsuit. 73 It should not be surprising, then, that many of these disputing parties who have finally reached the courthouse find it hard to believe that a reasonably fair resolution with the other party is possible. 74 Many-though certainly not al1-have given up any hope for a voluntary, jointly-developed resolution and now prefer to trust the judgment of a stranger, someone they hope will not only be impartial but benevolent, knowledgeable, and fair. 76 Indeed, research has shown that parties are more likely to perceive a mediation process as fair if the mediator listens but also engages at some point in an evaluative or directive intervention-e.g., if she helps parties to assess the strengths and weaknesses of their cases. 77 I have suggested elsewhere that the parties may turn to mediators in this manner because they seek reassurance that the resolution they are considering is reasonably fair. JUST. Sys. J, 151, 153 (1984) (noting by the time conflict comes to court it is serious enough that plaintiff wants outside intervention because they do not want to take dispute back into their own hands). 75 See Relis, supra note 64, at 478-79 (describing patients and doctors who wanted to talk with each other in medical malpractice mediations); see also Hensler, supra note 17, at 189 (claiming facilitative mediator, unlike evaluative mediator, would be more helpful in finding joint gains and allowing parties to come to own settlements as opposed to proposing resolution). All of this research suggests that most, though not all, parties want advice from someone they have decided they can trust. Other research, meanwhile, suggests that lawyers and other repeat players prefer an actual decision-provided that it is reached efficiently, consistent with the law and their expectations, and very likely to be complied with or enforced. They seem to care less than the average person-a one-shot player8°--about procedural justice. Indeed, some research suggests that lawyers' and repeat players' positive perceptions regarding the process will be much less likely to influence their assessments of the fairness or unfairness of the outcome.
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All of these factors may combine to explain the current directive or evaluative cast of much court-connected mediation, which exists in order to assist the mass processing of cases and is dominated by repeat players.
82 Further, the factors described supra certainly can tempt mediators and court-connected mediation programs to use, or acquiesce in the use of, coercive or muscle mediation in order to achieve settlements. 83 
III. INTRODUCTION OF MEDIATION INTO BANKRUPTCY COURTS
Mediation was first integrated into bankruptcy courts when the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California established a mediation program in 1986 .84 Courts in other parts of the country soon followed suit. 85 After passage of the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, bankruptcy judges began experimenting with ADR, including mediation, on an ad hoc basis.
86 That same year, under the auspices fair after mediator had suggested possible settlement option); see also 89 The mediator in that case was Cyrus Vance, and the mediation process, which lasted two weeks, was "called Camp Mediation by the creditors' army of lawyers and bankers. ' " 90 By 1995, twelve bankruptcy courts had adopted court-connected ADR programs. 9 ' Then, with the passage of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, federal bankruptcy courts received express authorization to use ADR processes, including mediation. 92 By 2004, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware was requiring that before parties could proceed with certain adversary proceedings, they had to attempt to reach resolution through mediation. 93 Today, as a result of the work of Professor Ralph Peeples, we know that 40 bankruptcy courts have rules or standing orders that permit mediation. 94 Professor William Woodward has revealed that, in addition to interesting experimentation with mediation in preference cases and bankruptcy appeals, a bankruptcy procedure spawned both the Piper Trust and a claims process that requires use of mediation. 95 Our unfortunately-difficult current economic conditions, combined with the successful use of mediation in this and other contexts, make it very likely that the use of mediation in bankruptcy will expand.
resolution).
87 See Penna, supra note 2 (discussing program set up by bankrupt Greyhound Lines Inc to deal with personal injury and property claims products utilized during real estate boom). However, lawyers seeking to use mediation in seemingly inappropriate ways might not be purposing these methods out of malice or to gain an unfair advantage but rather to pursue an altruistic means, such as expediating recovery for entitled and needy tort claimants. For example, see generally Penna, supra note 2 (reporting that Thomas Lauria, attorney for Greyhound, explained his client had intiated ADR in part to "balance bankruptcy policies which require efficient estate adminstration, on the one hand, and [responding to] the interests of personal injury and property damage claimants, on the one hand, who need and indeed are entitled to quick payments of their claims-without having to get involved in the ordinary complexity and delays associated with large corporate bankruptcy.").
103 See In re Am. Capital Equip., 405 B.R. at 423 (stating bad faith in process reason for not confirming plan). negotiation, and resolution. They expect mediators to make decisions and then grant substantial deference to those decisions. Admittedly, mediation is relatively ill-defined. Nonetheless, these judges and parties clearly do not understand even the existing, relatively minimal boundaries that define mediation and mediators.
One of the most significant uses of mediation in the bankruptcy context is the inclusion of the process in chapter 11 reorganization plans, in order to resolve claims that do not come within the limited jurisdiction of bankruptcy procedures. Courts appear to favor the process in this context, provided that it is being used in a manner that treats all interested parties appropriately--or at least not inappropriately. For example, in In re Eagle Bus Manufacturing, 0 4 the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Texas approved a prereorganization plan involving three-tiered ADR (i.e., offer and exchange; followed by 60 days of mediation; then binding arbitration).
0 5 In particular, the court approved the plan's use of these ADR procedures to resolve unsecured creditors' claims of personal injury, wrongful death claims and workers compensation. 10 6 In all three types of claims, liability was contested but could not be resolved in the bankruptcy court. 1 0 7 In approving the ADR plan in this case, the court affirmed ADR's ability to bridge the jurisdictional difficulties created by parallel proceedings in trial and bankruptcy courts and to bridge the standing issues created by bankruptcy's hierarchy of creditors.
Specifically, the ADR plan permitted unsecured creditors to reach resolution of their non-bankruptcy claims outside the context of the bankruptcy action.
In contrast, in 2009, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied a fifth' 08 reorganization plan proposed by Skinner Engine Company, based on the court's conclusion that the ADR plan was neither reasonable nor entered into in good faith.' 0 9 Somewhat like the plan in In re Eagle Bus Manufacturing, Skinner's plan provided for mediation of personal injury, asbestosrelated claims that had been brought against the debtor." 0 But Skinner's plan also required the personal injury claimants to pay to Skinner twenty-percent of the money they received from Skinner's insurers as a result of the mediation."' According to the Bankruptcy Court, Skinner planned to use these proceeds to fund its ADR plan and obtain a recovery for its general creditors." 2 [Vol. 17: 427
Insurers' defense" of Skinner." 3 Not surprisingly, and particularly because they had never made any payments on these claims, some of which had existed for 20 years, 114 Skinner's insurers objected to this scheme." 5 The court labeled the ADR plan "collusion"
' 16 and held that Skinner's reorganization plan was "unconfirmable" without the insurers' consent." 1 7 Ultimately, the court found the reorganization plan so troublesome that it converted Skinner's chapter 11 reorganization into a chapter 7
liquidation." 8 This case is an extreme example that illustrates both abuse of the mediation process and the limits of courts' willingness to look favorably upon mediation's unique ability to bridge jurisdictional boundaries and aid reorganizing debtors.
The case also illustrates some parties' total-and seemingly willful-lack of respect for the different roles of mediator and judge. Indeed, the case may be an example of the potential for creatively manipulative parties to use mediation's and mediators' ambiguous definitions to try to avoid the limits-jurisdictional, substantive, and procedural-established by law."l 9 Specifically, Skinner and its coProponents' proposed Alternative Dispute Resolution Process called upon the presiding judge to serve as "an arbitrator, mediator, or something else"' 120 yet "to make final binding determinations as to the validity and valuation of contested optin Asbestos Claims"'' , thus requiring the court "in its official capacity, to finally liquidate such claims, and without any chance for review by another court.' 2 2 One problem with the parties' plan, of course, is that, by law, bankruptcy courts do not By simply changing the judge's title-from "judge" to "arbitrator, mediator, or something else"-the parties apparently hoped to avoid the bankruptcy court's inconvenient jurisdictional limits (and perhaps the need to pay the substantial fees that would be required for a private arbitrator, mediator or other type of neutral). And what would give the parties who had developed this Alternative Dispute Resolution Process the power to revoke the title of "judge" and replace it with "arbitrator, mediator, or something else"? Clearly frustrated, Judge McCullough summarized (and critiqued) the parties' arguments as follows:
The Court understands the Debtor and the Co-Proponents to respond.. .that (a) the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process constitutes part of a settlement of the Asbestos Claims, and (b) this Court's final liquidation of contested opt-in Asbestos Claims, because it is part of such process, can be done regardless of this Court's lack of authority to so finally liquidate outside of such process. By logical extension, this Court can only presume that, by arguing that this Court can so finally liquidate within the confines of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process notwithstanding this Court's lack of authority to otherwise so finally liquidate, the Debtor and the Co-Proponents argue, as well, that this Court (a) is free to act (and will act when finally liquidating within the confines of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process) other than as the presiding Court that it is vis-d-vis the instant bankruptcy case-for instance, as an arbitrator, mediator, or something else, and (b) may thereby transgress the legal confines of its official position. Unfortunately for the Debtor and the Co-Proponents, this Court is [Vol. 17: 427 unaware of any legal authority that would permit it to so act while, at the same time, it also acts as the presiding Court. Furthermore, the relevant provisions of the Fifth Plan and CADP cited to above refer to this Court as "the Bankruptcy Court" when it makes its final determinations thereunder, which indicates to the Court that the Debtor and the Co-Proponents expect that this Court, when making final determinations within the confines of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process, will only act within its official capacity as the presiding Court in the instant bankruptcy case. Acting in such official capacity, this Court, as set forth above, may not finally liquidate contested opt-in Asbestos Claims, and even to the extent that it can act with respect to such claims, such action will necessarily be reviewable by another court.
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The parties' position here-which would have allowed them and the court to "contract out" of the legal restrictions established by statute-was not necessarily unprincipled. Within the past few years, legal commentators have urged that statutes and court rules should be understood as merely "default" rules, subject to revision by parties who can imagine and implement dispute resolution procedures that are more responsive to their needs. 126 The Supreme Court has recently dealt with parties arguing that they, not the Federal Arbitration Act, should be able to dictate the judicial standard of review to be used in determining whether to vacate an arbitral award. (The Court has rejected that argument. 1 2 7 ) Professor Leonard Riskin and I have argued recently that courts should be willing to customize the mediation process. 28 In recent years, as well, the line between private and public entities has become blurred. 129 Further, there are some judges who have willingly become and called themselves 'mediators." 30 Though well-intentioned and principled people can differ regarding the wisdom of this semantic choice when the mediator-judge does not and will not be required to preside over the case at trial, 13 ' there can be no doubt of the coercive twist that a mediation has taken when the mediator and the presiding judge are the same person. 132 So there is some sort of precedent for the arguments made by Skinner, its coProponents, and their lawyers. In 2009, however, in the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, these parties took this concept too far. They tried to use arbitration, mediation "or something else" to force Skinner's insurers into the role of (unwilling) investors in Skinner's continued operation, and they tried to force a presiding judge into the role of an (unwilling) "alternative" neutral. 33 Arguably, the parties' plan represented the creation of just another new, inoffensive hybrid process. To invoke a very old phrase, however, these parties tried to use mediation [Vol, 17: 427 to 'have their cake and eat it too.' A careful judge, 134 apparently alerted by skilled lawyers representing self-interested insurers, 135 carefully examined the details of the proposed plan and its consequences and stopped the potential abuse of mediation, ADR more generally, the bankruptcy court, and federal statutes. 131 In contrast, other cases signal that at least some bankruptcy judges do not fully understand the appropriate limits of the mediator's role. Indeed, some courts sometimes seem to view mediators largely as substitutes for trustees, special masters, arbitrators, magistrates or examiners-none of whom is a judge but all of whom have an evaluative or adjudicative function similar to that of a judge. Only mediators' enhanced ability to protect the confidentiality of what is said, done, and produced during the mediation process seems worth notice-and use.1
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In 1998, for example, the Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida approved a joint motion to appoint a mediator. 138 In its opinion, the Bankruptcy ., only if the Debtor's defense -or, more accurately, the Insurers' defense of the Debtor -with respect to such claim(s) is unsuccessful."). It is well beyond the scope of this Article to determine the strength of many of those arguments, particularly: whether Pennsylvania law was applicable here; whether Pennsylvania law effectively restricts parties from entering into settlements without their insurers' consent; whether such a settlement by the parties may be deemed unreasonable simply because the insurer has refused to pay such claims for 20 years, etc. See id. at 419-22 (discussing whether state law restricts debtor's ability to settle without insurers' consent and whether settlement was reasonable). I am also unable to determine the extent to which the judge's careful analysis was based upon the work of an astute judicial clerk. 136 This cautionary tale may be useful fodder for those currently arguing that coverage of the law related to ADR should be "mainstreamed" in the law school curriculum. See id. at 425 (noting how settlement had to be rejected due to its creation through unintended use of alternative dispute resolution). ) (analyzing how despite movement to require disclosure of settlement agreements dealing with issues of public concern, "confidentiality and secrecy are often needed" to allow for effective resolution of disputes when disclosure may damage parties involved and noting how potential for this damage promotes confidentiality, privacy, and immunity in the mediation setting); Ellen E. Court established the following procedures and terms for the mediation: the parties were to split the cost of the mediator's services, who was to be compensated based upon the magnitude and complexity of the proceedings; the mediator was to have the authority to order depositions or interrogatories to any person or entity that might possess information determined by the mediator to be necessary; and the mediation was to be covered by a broad confidentiality rule. 1 39 The court specified that its confidentiality provisions did not mean that evidence otherwise produced could not be used in "any further hearing in the case"' 40 but confidentiality was to protect "what the parties and the mediator discuss[ed] and present[ed]"'1 4 1 in the course of the mediation. Giving a mediator the authority to order discovery-an authority generally reserved for judges, trustees, special masters, magistrates, and arbitrators-and coupling it with confidentiality covering all of what was to be discussed and presented in mediation seems to be a recipe for confusion and abuse of process. 142 Similarly, when the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Illinois 1 43 upheld a mediation and binding arbitration clause within a contract for the provision of auditing services, the court appeared to expect the mediator to possess the authority of an arbitrator. 44 The court appointed a trustee who filed an adversary complaint for professional negligence and breach of contract against Checkers, the (1986)) (noting heavy presumption in favor of arbitration and stating arbitrability will be left to arbitrator when parties have explicitly agreed to arbitration provision). Along with the mediation and arbitration clause, the contract set forth specific services that Checkers, an accounting firm, would perform for Griffin, the debtor. The contract included, among other provisions, the following: 1) auditing responsibilities; 2) making "specific inquires of management and others about the representations embodied in the financial statement;"
3) examining Griffin's control system to ensure the safety of assets and that "transactions are executed in accordance with management's authorization." Id. at 670. The contract also stated that any "differences concerning our services or fees" will be sent to mediation, then arbitration. Id. at 672. During the time Checkers was auditing Griffin, Griffin's CFO was trading stocks with company money. Id. at 670. Although the auditors asked the CFO about a suspicious account, they did not investigate further. Id. A year after the audit, Griffin filed for chapter 7 protection after the CFO came forward and admitted to losing approximately $2,000,000. Id. at 671. Once appointed, the trustee filed a complaint against Checkers for professional negligence and breach of contract. Id. at 669.
[Vol. 17: 427 organization that provided the auditing services. 145 The court held that the plain language of the contract required the use of mediation, then arbitration, and, therefore, the parties were bound by the clause. 46 More significantly for the purposes of this Article, the court stated "if the parties clearly and unmistakably agree to arbitrate, then the question of arbitrability is for an arbitrator."' 14 7
Presumably, the court also understood that the question of mediability would be for the mediator.
Some courts' apparent confusion regarding the appropriate limits that should be placed upon the role of the mediator also has emerged in a couple of cases in which courts have had the opportunity to require and affirm the determinations of mediators. In Hickox v. Friedland (In re HBLS, L.P.), 48 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York determined that a dispute arising out of a mediation agreement should be submitted to the mediator for a decision and the court then deferred to that decision. 149 The facts, as so often seems to be the case in corporate reorganizations, are a little complicated. In 1993, HBLS filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. 150 Charles Hickox ("Hickox") was a shareholder of HBLS and two other corporations, LIR and MBM. 5 The three corporations ran a resort together and were known as "Resort Entities."mediator's final award, Friedland moved for entry of a deficiency judgment.
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Hickox opposed this motion as against LIR and MBM, claiming that under the Settlement Agreement, only HBLS was liable to Friedland Group. After some extended procedural wrangling,' 58 the Bankruptcy Court submitted the specific issue of LIR's and MBM's liability to the mediator. The mediator wrote a decision declaring HBLS, LIR and MBM jointly and severally liable under the Settlement Agreement. The bankruptcy court confirmed the mediator's award on the basis that it was not in manifest disregard of the law 15 9 and reinstated a deficiency judgment that it had entered earlier.
Hickox appealed to the district court, claiming that by seeking a deficiency judgment, Friedland had waived the right to have the mediator arbitrate, 60 the claim and also that the mediator's award was in error. As to the latter issue, the district court determined that it had to "decide de novo whether the mediator's ruling was in manifest disregard of the law."' 16 1 According to the court, there was "no basis to overturn the mediator's award" because: 1) Hickox had attacked the Settlement Agreement only on the merits and failed to allege the mediator's manifest disregard of the law; 2) "the Mediator's interpretation of the terms of the Settlement Agreement is not so clearly inconsistent with the Agreement's plain terms that the Mediator could be said to have manifestly disregarded the law;" and 3) the Mediator had firsthand knowledge of the parties' spirit and intent and had found that the parties had conducted themselves as if they intended to make LIR and MBM liable.
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The most notable points here are that both the bankruptcy court and the district court relied on a "mediator" to arbitrate and then applied a deferential 63 [Vol. 17: 427 difficulties creating a reorganization plan, so the court appointed a "mediator" to determine if the negotiations were at an impasse. With the help of the mediator, the parties began to make progress towards a consensual plan. As part of the process, the mediator met with "the active parties in sharpest disagreement." ' 65 He did not involve two of the creditor committees. When the agreement between the "active parties" was announced to the other two committees, one committee made a counterproposal.1 66 The mediation stalled. The mediator indicated his intent to send a letter to the judge stating "at least for the time being, negotiations are at an impasse."'1 67 Several weeks later, however, the mediator sent a "clarifying" letter to counsel stating that they "should not consider those letters as declaring an impasse." '168 In the meantime, the two excluded creditor-committees had filed motions aimed at ending the period of exclusivity. 1 69 In order to succeed on these motions, they were required to show cause, such as delay by the debtor as a tactical device or another action in bad faith. One committee argued that it had been treated unfairly by being left out of the mediation and that this constituted sufficient cause. 170 The court responded: "In the present bankruptcy case, all of the constituencies acquiesced both in the initiation of mediation, and the selection of the mediator. The mediator has expressed the view that impasse has not occurred..
• . This court sees no reason to question the judgment of the mediator on this score." ' 7 ' The standard of review used by the court here is unclear but it certainly appears deferential. The court upheld the determination of the mediator and refused to terminate the period of exclusivity.
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The bankruptcy cases described here suggest that bankruptcy courts and repeat players are exhibiting some confusion regarding the appropriate roles of mediation and mediators. Further, these cases suggest that bankruptcy courts and repeat players may wish to seek neutrals who possess both consensual skills and adjudicative authority. This Article will now turn to the evolution of divorce and child custody mediation and the role of "traditional neutrals" in that context, who may be mining the courts' experience with mediation in order to develop innovative and tailored hybrid procedures. 165 Id. at 146. 166 Id. (noting Official Unsecured Creditors' Committee "responded with a counterproposal, the contents of which, consistent with the requirement of the mediation order that the court not be informed of the proceedings before the mediator" were not disclosed to court). to the phenomenon of increasing and more difficult caseloads, static or reduced hiring of mediators, static or reduced court funding, and no reduction in the public's or courts' expectations for the prompt disposition of cases. 7 9
The divorce and child custody mediation that produced such positive results in the 1980s took time-perhaps five to six hours per case-with each mediation session lasting a couple of hours. Increasingly, due to increased caseloads and static hiring, divorce and child custody mediations must be completed in an hour.' 80 Inevitably, in order to achieve settlement, mediators are tempted to adopt more evaluative, directive and even coercive approaches.' 1 8 There is a possibility that these settlements still reflect the parents' "self-determination," but that seems unlikely.
In addition, the people being served by divorce and child custody mediation may be becoming more difficult-and expensive-for courts to handle.'
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Throughout the country, courts note the increase of pro se litigants. 183 More parties require translation services. 184 There is also more reporting of domestic abuse, child abuse, and substance abuse in divorce and child custody matters.1 85 Finally, though, mediation is no longer the only process besides traditional litigation that family courts can provide. This is especially true for disputing parents who want, or can benefit from, the opportunity to be directly involved in the reorganization of their family but who also need help with this profoundly important change. In some courts, 186 caring and pragmatic court administrators, sugesting mediators are pushing settlement rather than providing options). See id. at 377 (discussing "question as to whether court-connected mediation continues to deliver on the promise of family self-determination").
180 See id. at 379 (referencing opinion that insufficient time is being offered for parents to effectively resolve differences) (citation omitted); see also Edwards, supra note 177, at 650 ("Some mediation services can only offer the parents an hour or even less to resolve their differences."); Kelly, Family Mediation, supra note 175, at 29 (suggesting client dissatisfaction with mediation might "reflect[ ] a more rushed or coercive mediation process").
'8' See Salem, supra note 175, at 378-79 (discussing directive and evaluative approaches for settlements in divorce and child custody cases to deal with timing issues); see also 185 See Saposnek, supra note 177, at 38 (discussing increase in serious problems reported during divorce cases from 1980s to present day). Importantly, it is not clear whether the actual incidence of these problems is increasing, whether people are more willing to admit to dealing with such issues, or whether court personnel are more likely to detect issues of abuse now than previously. Early neutral evaluation-a "confidential abbreviated process in which parties, accompanied by lawyers if represented, present their case to two evaluators who provide an early indication of their likely recommendation with the caveat that such recommendations are based on parties' ability to verify their claims and allegations"' 89 * Collaborative law-"an interest based negotiation approach to lawyer-assisted settlement negotiations that frequently incorporates mental health and financial professionals" as well as direct party participation in settlement negotiations and in which "lawyers withdraw if the case does not settle and proceeds to trial" 90 ; and * Cooperative negotiation agreements or cooperative law-"lawyerassisted settlement negotiations that typically incorporate voluntary information sharing, interest based negotiation, direct involvement of clients, confidential negotiations, children's best interest as an essential ingredient and disincentives (not including withdrawal of counsel) to litigation."
, 19 1,192 These procedures involve custody investigators, court staff, lawyers-the "traditional neutrals" and professionals who may have felt (or have actually been) supplanted by mediators. The "traditional neutrals" did not go away. They regrouped, learned new approaches and skills, and adapted to respond to both mediation's challenge and the needs of the many parties still turning to the courts for help.
Some innovative family courts seem to be adopting something akin to the multi-door courthouse. For example, some courts that formerly required all divorcing parties to attempt mediation before they could proceed to other, more intrusive and adjudicative procedures, now require divorcing parties to engage in an interactive process with a trained court services counselor. Together, the parties and the counselor use a research-based screening and assessment instrument, supplemented by the counselor's clinical judgment, to determine the most appropriate procedure. 193 This is called the "triage" model of delivering court services, as contrasted with the "tiered" service model. 1 94 It may seem that all of this innovation represents a repudiation and rejection of mediation. It is not. Rather, it represents a recognition that mediation is not, cannot be, and never should have been expected to be, the cure-all for every ill. Like most organisms, mediation requires structural protection in order to achieve its potential-e.g., sufficient time for deliberation; mediators who are not afraid of the consequences that may be visited upon them if mediating parties refuse to settle; authority to refuse service to parties who have demonstrated their inability or unwillingness to benefit from participation in the process; and complementary services to which mediators may refer.
Mediation blazed the way in creating an alternative to traditional litigation in the family courts, but it has now been joined by other procedures, customized to respond to the characteristics and circumstances of those who must use them 95 in order to receive judicial permission to divorce and parent their children.
1 96 In at least some pioneering courts, there are now several paths to the resolution of divorce and child custody matters, hopefully with all processes sharing a commitment to the provision of an experience of justice.
VI. LESSONS FOR BANKRUPTCY MEDIATION
There is no doubt that mediation offers unique advantages for the resolution of disputes-the ability to deal with all of the issues, not just those that come within the jurisdiction of a particular court; the opportunity to exploit the parties' knowledge and skills, rather than relying exclusively on the lawyers, to develop creative, customized solutions; the opportunity to experience those moments of grace when people suddenly see each other and understand something about each other and their situation that they did not understand before.
And yet, the "fit" between mediation-especially the facilitative, elicitive, and transformative models of mediation-and the mass processing of cases in civil litigation has often been an uneasy one. Perhaps this model of mediation has been expected to do too much. The recent emergence of new, hybrid processes in the 195 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268-69 (1970) ("The opportunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who are to be heard.").
196 See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 382-83 (1971) (requiring access to courts for indigent parties because states have monopoly on ability to adjust this fundamental human relationship). These procedures also may reflect judicial acknowledgement of the need to adapt to "the exigencies of the circumstances" that burden courts. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533-34 (2004) (explaining that exigencies in enemy combatant proceedings might allow "[h]earsay, for example .... to be accepted as the most reliable available evidence from the Government").
197 See Brazil, supra note 131, at I (noting importance "for judges to think systematically and carefully" regarding their role in settlement negotiation and providing pros and cons of different formats for settlement conferences); Jean R. Stemlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration as a Substitute for the Jury Trial, 738 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 20-21 (2004) (discussing failure of "lawyers, courts, and policy makers" to take sufficient notice of mandatory arbitration's denial of jury trial to claimants); Welsh, Future of Mediation, supra note 193, at 22 (explaining that "the people and government of The Netherlands seem to support the legitimacy of multiple and different, freely-chosen paths to justice . . . [including] dispute resolution paths"); see also Welsh, Making Deals, supra note 46, at 861 ("The experience of justice should not be set aside as some 'sweet old fashioned notion' that has outlived its usefulness to modem, settlementdirected civil litigation. Instead, mediation ... should be allowed to demonstrate that justice can and should have everything to do with the 'world of bargaining'....").
[Vol. 17: 427 divorce and child custody area that use the knowledge, expertise, and adjudicative authority of "traditional neutrals" while also incorporating some of mediation's elements-aspects of self-determination, the opportunity for respectful but less formal voice and consideration, the neutral's skillful facilitation of dialogue and mutual consideration between the parties-suggests that bankruptcy judges, repeat players, and policy makers should look at all of their options and their current personnel before settling exclusively upon mediation and mediators as 'the brand new thing' and the only meaningful 'alternative' to traditional litigation.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to examine in detail the efficacy of potential hybrids in the bankruptcy context. Based on the experience of divorce and child custody mediation, however, a few possibilities come to mind. Currently, trustees administer debtors' estates in chapter 7 matters but assume this role in chapter 11 matters only in extreme situations in which creditors have completely lost confidence in the honesty or competence of debtors-in-possession.
1 98 Perhaps trustees could play a useful, potentially less intrusive role before situations have become so dire. The procedure of non-confidential dispute resolution and assessment, for example, suggests the possibility that trustees could step in to facilitate negotiations between the debtor and worried creditors, conduct an assessment, interview employees and customers, gather other information, and ultimately make a recommendation to the court before wresting control from the debtor-in-possession.
Examiners might be empowered to begin offering a confidential, truncated process in which representatives of the debtor and creditors present their case to two examiners who then provide a tentative recommendation, recognizing that this recommendation is based on the debtor's and creditors' ability to substantiate their claims and defenses. Examiners might even follow this procedure with an opportunity for facilitated negotiation.199 Of course, bankruptcy courts would need to ensure that trustees and examiners have sufficient training to play any such new roles and receive appropriate compensation. This presents an obvious challenge, particularly at a time of reduced resources. Outside the courts, some bankruptcy lawyers may wish to explore the application of collaborative or cooperative law to the negotiation of reorganization plans.
These broad brush ideas only begin to suggest the ways in which the divorce and child custody area might offer intriguing potential models that participants in the bankruptcy field may wish to investigate. Obviously, there are significant differences between family law and bankruptcy law. These differences need to be acknowledged, and, even if a divorce and child custody hybrid looks sufficiently promising to merit investigation and adoption, adaptations almost certainly will be required. 200 This Article is meant only to stimulate curiosity and encourage further and deeper consideration of the possibilities.
CONCLUSION
Why should we care about the confusing and conflicting uses of mediation that have surfaced in bankruptcy matters? If the process settles case, why mess with it? The response to this question is two-fold. First and simply, mediation should mean something. People entering into the process should know what to expect, how the mediator will behave toward them, and whether use of their statements and behaviors will be protected by confidentiality or the mediation privilege. Multiple paths to resolution permit parties to choose the path most appropriate to their needs and preferences. 201 Further, it is only if mediation and mediators have a recognized (and thus valued) function and form that they can play their role and permit other processes and actors to play theirs. Ultimately, the mediation process is then more likely to receive the support it needs in order to fulfill its promise and provide an experience of justice for all of those who participate in it.
Many years ago, Owen Fiss, 20 2 Tina Grillo 20 3 and Richard Delgado 204 offered serious critiques of settlement in general and mediation in particular. For reasons that now seem almost sweetly naive, mediation advocates and program designers thought their (or more accurately, our) good intentions would inoculate mediation from the challenges presented by reality. As a result, some of the fears expressed by Fiss, Grillo and Delgado have been realized. Today, if mediation advocates in the bankruptcy context are willing to learn from others' her/history, they can choose to structure the use of bankruptcy mediation more protectively. Hubris is said to
